Abstract. We argue that EPR-type correlations do not entail any form of "non-locality", when viewed in the context of a relational interpretation of quantum mechanics. The abandonment of strict Einstein realism advocated by this interpretation permits to reconcile quantum mechanics, completeness, (operationally defined) separability, and locality.
Introduction
EPR-type experiments, championed by Aspect et al. [1, 2] , are often interpreted as empirical evidence for the existence of a somewhat mysterious "quantum non-locality". For instance, Chris Isham concludes his beautiful exposition of the EPR debate with the words "[...] we are obliged either to stick to a pragmatic approach or strict instrumentalist interpretation, or else to accept the existence of a strange non-locality that seems hard to reconcile with our normal concepts of spatial separation between independent entities" [3] . On a similar vein, Travis Norsen writes recently: "What Bells theorem proves is that the predictions of quantum mechanics for certain experimental results -predictions that have stood up to the test of experiment-are inconsistent with the principle of local causality, period" [4] . In spite of seven decades of reflection on this problem, the precise nature of this non-locality -which does not appear to be usable to transmit information, nor does make quantum theory incompatible with special relativity-remains rather elusive.
In recent years, a novel point of view on quantum theory, denoted Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM) has been discussed by some authors [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12] . In this paper, we argue that in the context of this interpretation, it is not necessary to abandon locality in order to account for EPR correlations. From the relational perspective, the apparent "quantum non-locality" is a mistaken illusion caused by the error of disregarding the quantum nature of all physical systems.
The price for saving locality is the weakening of realism which is the core of RQM. In fact, the historical development of the EPR debate testifies to a significant mutation of the stakes of the EPR argument. In the original 1935 EPR article [13] , this argument was conceived as an attack against the description of measurements in Copenhagen quantum theory, and a criticism to the idea that Copenhagen QM could be a complete description of reality. Completeness, locality, and a strong form of realism were argued by EPR to be incompatible with QM predictions. With Bell's contribution [15] , the argument has been mostly reinterpreted as a challenge to "local realism". More recently, especially after the Kochen-Specker theorem [16] , it is the very possibility of uncritically ascribing "properties" to a quantum system, that has been questioned. The problem of locality has thus moved to the background, replaced by a mounting critique of strong notions of reality (see for instance [17] ).
Here we take this conceptual evolution to what appears to us to be its necessary arriving point: the possibility that EPR-type experiments disprove Einstein's strong realism, rather than locality.
Similar views have been recently expressed by a number of authors [18, 19, 20, 21] . In particular, in a recent article [22] , Asher Peres concludes his analysis of the EPR problem with a general statement, which, as we shall see below, is precisely the ground assumption of RQM.
Relational quantum mechanics, locality and separability
The relational approach claims that a number of confusing puzzles raised by Quantum Mechanics (QM) result from the unjustified use of the notion of objective, or absolute, state of a physical system. The way out from the confusion suggested by RQM consists in acknowledging the fact that different observers can give different accounts of the same sequence of events [5] . Notice, indeed, that there is no operational definition of observer-independent comparison (one is tempted to say "synchronization") of different observers' information about a system: the information of different observers can be compared only by a physical exchange of information between the observers. But since all systems are quantum systems, any exchange of information is a physical interaction, and as such subject to the laws (and in particular the uncertainties) of quantum mechanics. The comparison of information is itself a physical quantum process.
Bohr and Heisenberg's key idea that "no phenomenon is a phenomenon until it is an observed phenomenon" must therefore apply to each observer independently. This description of physical reality, though fundamentally fragmented, is assumed in RQM to be the best possible one, i.e. to be complete: "Quantum mechanics is a theory about the physical description of physical systems relative to other systems, and this is a complete description of the world" [5] .
2.1. RQM and physical reality. In the context of the EPR debate, realism is taken as the assumption that, in Einstein's words, "there exists a physical reality independent of substantiation and perception" [23] 1 . RQM departs radically from such strict Einstein realism. In RQM, physical reality is taken to be formed by the individual quantum events (facts 2 ) through which interacting systems (objects 3 ) affect one another. Quantum events exist only in interactions 4 and the reality of each quantum event is only relative to the system involved in the interaction. In particular, the reality of the properties of any given system S is only relative to a physical systems A that interacts with S and is affected by these properties.
If A keeps track of the properties of S (relative to A), then A has information about S. According to RQM, this information exhausts the content of any observer's description of the physical world.
Michel Bitbol proposes to qualify this approach as a meta-description [10] : RQM is the set of rules specifying the form of any such physical description. In that sense, RQM is faithful to Bohr's epistemological position, as presented for instance in [26] :
It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to find out how nature is. Physics concerns what we can say about nature. Still, RQM adds an essential twist to this position of Bohr: For Bohr, the "we" that can say something about nature is a preferred macroscopic classical observer that escapes the laws of quantum theory: facts, namely results of quantum measurements, are produced interacting with this classical observer. In RQM, the preferred observer is abandoned. Indeed, it is a fundamental assumption of this approach that nothing distinguishes a priori systems and observers: In reality this simplistic definition does not do justice to Einstein's subtle position concerning physical reality, which is far more instrumental and programmatic than metaphysical: see [24] for an insightful analysis.
The world is the totality of facts, not of things" [25] .
3 "2.01 An atomic fact is a combination of objects (entities, things). 2.011 It is essential to a thing that it can be a constituent part of an atomic fact" [25] .
any physical system provides a potential observer, and physics concerns what can be said about nature on the basis of the information that any physical system can, in principle, have. The preferred Copenhagen observer is relativized into the multiplicity of observers, formed by all possible physical systems, and therefore it does not anymore escape the laws of quantum mechanics.
Different observers can of course exchange information, but we must not forget that such information exchange is itself a quantum mechanical interaction. An exchange of information is therefore a quantum measurement performed by one observing system A upon another observing system B. As we shall see, it is the disregard of this fact of nature that creates the illusion of the EPR non-locality.
2.2.
The physical meaning of ψ. Regularities in natural phenomena, that is, laws of nature, mean that an observer A may be able to make (probabilistic) predictions about future interactions with a system S on the basis of the information previously acquired via past interactions. The tool for doing this is the quantum state ψ of S.
Since predictions are based on past interactions, ψ is, first of all, essentially just a coding of the outcome of these previous interactions. But these outcomes are facts that are real only with respect to A. Therefore the state ψ is only relative to A: ψ is the coding of the information that A has about S. Because of this irreducible epistemic character, ψ is a relative state, and cannot be taken to be an objective property of the single system S, independent from A. Every state of quantum theory is a relative state.
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On the other hand, the state ψ is a tool that can be used by A to predict future outcomes of interactions between S and A. In general these predictions depend on the time t at which the interaction will take place. In the Schrödinger picture this time dependence is coded into a time evolution of the state ψ itself. In this picture, there are therefore two distinct manners in which ψ can evolve: (i) in a discrete way, when S and A interact, in order for the information to be adjusted, and (ii) in a continuous way, to reflect the time dependence of the probabilistic relation between past and future events.
From the relational perspective the Heisenberg picture appears far more natural: ψ codes the information that can be extracted from past interactions and has no explicit dependence on time; it is adjusted only as a result of an interaction, namely as a result of a new quantum event relative to the observer. If physical reality is the set of these bipartite interactions, and nothing else, our description of dynamics by means of relative states should better mirror this fact: discrete changes of the relative state, when information is updated, and nothing else. What evolves with time are the operators, whose expectation values code the time-dependent probabilities that can be computed on the basis of the past quantum events.
6
To summarize, two distinct aspects of physical information, epistemic and predictive, are subsumed under the notion of relative state; amending Bohr's epistemology, we can say that QM is the theory of logical relations between the two.
2.3. Locality. We call locality the principle demanding that two spatially separated objects cannot have instantaneous mutual influence. We will argue that this is not contradicted by EPR-type correlations, if we take the relational perspective on quantum mechanics.
In fact, locality is at the roots of the observation that different observers do not describe the same reality. As emphasized by Einstein, it is locality that makes possible the individuation of physical systems, including those we call observers 7 . Distinct observers that are distant and not interacting do not describe the same reality. An indication of this fact is in the well-known difficulty of describing and interpreting the relativistic transformation law of the wave function, when measurements involve observers in relative motion [28] . Even beyond its foundation role in relativistic field theories, locality constitutes, therefore, the base of the relational methodology: an observer must not, and cannot, account for events involving systems located out of its causal neighborhood (or light-cone).
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The idea that locality imposes a relativization in the description of reality is certainly not new: it is precisely the physical content of special relativity. When we say that simultaneity is relative, we mean that distant observers cannot take note of a given event instantaneously, and thus ascribe it the same time as their own. The meaning of the adjective "relative" in the RQM notion of "relative state" is therefore very similar to the meaning of "relative" in special relativity. It is the translation of the impossibility of principle to transmit information faster than light brated book on quantum mechanics, Dirac uses Heisenberg states (he calls them relativistic) [29] . In later editions, he switches to Schrödinger states, explaining in the preface that it is easier to calculate with these, but it is "a pity" to give up Heisenberg states, which are more fundamental. In what was perhaps his last public seminar, in Sicily, Dirac used a single transparency, with just one sentence: "The Heisenberg picture is the right one".
7 "Without the assumption of the mutually independent existence (the 'being-thus') of spatially distant things, an assumption which originates in everyday thought, physical thought in the sense familiar to us would not be possible. Nor one does can see how physical laws could be formulated and tested without such a clean separation." Quoted in [30] , where this point is discussed in depth. 8 We can take this observation as an echo in fundamental physics of the celebrated: "7. Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent" [25] .
-and without a physical interaction. To stress the analogy, we can say that the conceptual difficulties raised by the interpretation of the Lorentz transformations before 1905 came from the lack of appreciation of the epistemic nature of simultaneity.
2.4. Separability. Another concept playing an important role in the EPR discussions is separability. An option that saves a (weakened) form of locality is, according to some, to assume that entangled quantum objects are "not-separable". Aspect, for instance, writes that "a pair of twin entangled photons must in fact be regarded as a single, inseparable system, described by a global quantum state" [31] . This rather strange conception, where two systems are actually a single system, indicates, in our opinion, the difficulty to conciliate realism, locality and quantum theory.
We will argue below that the abandonment of Einstein's strict realism allows one to exempt himself from this type of intellectual acrobatics.
Let us instead formulate the following definition of separability: two physical systems S 1 and S 2 are separable if there exist a complete set of observables (in the sense of Dirac) of the compound system S 1 + S 2 whose values can be actualized by measurements on S 1 or S 2 only. Such observables are called individual observables; the others are called collective observables.
This notion of separability is equivalent to a minimal operational definition of subsystems of a composite system. It is deliberately weak (and in the end trivial); any stronger definition testifies to some unease towards reality.
The EPR argument
Let us review Einstein's formulation 9 of the EPR argument.
3.1.
Reminder of the setting (in Bohm's setting). Consider a radioactive decay, producing two spin-half particles, and call them α and β. Suppose that some previous measurement ensures that the square of the total spin of the two particles equals to zero -which corresponds, in the spectroscopic vocabulary, to the singlet state. The particles α and β leave the source in two different directions, reaching two distant detectors A and B, which measure their spin in given directions.
3.2.
Einstein's version of the EPR argument. According to QM, the measurement of an observable provokes the projection of the system's state onto the eigenspace associated with the eigenvalue obtained. In the case of the singlet, the state can be equivalently decomposed 9 For a detailed discussion of Einstein's position on the question of locality, appreciably different from the one presented in the original EPR article, see [30, 24] 
Depending on whether the observer A measures the spin of α in the direction z or x, the second particle β finds itself in an eigenstate of S z or S x . In either case, the property of having a definite spin in one direction is uniquely determined for β, hence is real, since, according to Einstein's realism, If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity.
[13] But according to the principle of locality, the choice made by A cannot have an influence on β, which is spacelike separated from A. Therefore, in order to accommodate both possibilities it is necessary for the spin in both directions to be uniquely determined. But this is more physical information than the one contained in a vector in the Hilbert space of the states of β. Hence there exist real properties not described by quantum mechanics. Completeness of quantum mechanics, namely one-to-one correspondence between the mathematical objects used to describe the state of a system and its real state is disproved.
Thus, Einstein's reasoning leads to the conclusion that either QM is incomplete, or it is incompatible with locality. As well known, Bell was later able to reinforce the argument: any hypothetical complete classical dynamics giving the same correlations as quantum mechanics violates locality.
3.3. Relational critique. Einstein's argument relies on the strongly realistic hypothesis that the actual properties of the particles (the "real state of affairs") revealed by the detectors are observer-independent. It is this hypothesis that justifies the ascription of a definite, objective, state to each particle, at every instant of the experiment: in Einstein's account, when B measures the spin of β, the measured value instantaneously acquires an objective existence for A. This hypothesis is not physically justified: nothing enables A to know the outcome of the measure carried out by B on β, unless A measures the state of B. But A cannot measure the state of B instantaneously, precisely because of locality: B is far away.
What is missing in Einstein's quotation above is the distinction between "elements of physical reality" (quantum events) relative to A and "elements of physical reality" relative to B.
Observer A can of course measure the state of B (or, for that matter, β), but only when A is back into causal contact with B [14] . This is, needless to say, in the future light-cone of A, and therefore poses no challenge for locality. In other words, Einstein's reasoning requires the existence of a hypothetical super-observer that can instantaneously measure the state of A and B. It is the hypothetical existence of such nonlocal super-being, and not QM, that violates locality.
Let us look at the origin of the mistake more in detail. Suppose that A measures a spin component of α at time t 0 , and B measures a spin component of β at time t ′ 0 . Einstein's ingenious counterfactual argument works under the assumption that locality prevents any causal influence of A's measurement on B's (A's choice of measuring the spin along z or along x cannot affect the B measurement, hence we can counterfactually join the consequences of the two alternatives). But for such counterfactuality to be effective, there has to exist an objective element of reality which is unaffected by A's actions. Indeed, if one acknowledges that B's state of affairs is a priori undefined for A, then bringing B into the argument is useless, because then what would be actualized by A's measurement of the spin of α along one direction would be relative to A only. In fact, Einstein implicitly assumes that B is a classical system, recording objective values in its "pointer variables". That is, even if A can see the position of B's pointer variables only at the later time t 1 , this position has nevertheless had a determined position since t ′ 0 10 . Thus, the properties of β become actual when it interacts with B at time t ′ 0 , indeed substantiating the non-local EPR correlations between distant locations. Thus, it is the assumption that B is classical and fails to obey quantum theory that creates EPR non-locality.
But all systems are quantum: there are no intrinsically classical systems. Hence the hypothesis that B does not obey quantum theory is not physically correct. It is this mistaken hypothesis that causes the apparent violation of locality.
In other words, in the sequence of events which is real for A there is no definite quantum event regarding β at time t 0 , and therefore no element of reality generated nonlocally at time t 0 in the location where B is. Hence Einstein's argument cannot even begin to be formulated.
What changes instantaneously at time t 0 , for A, is not the objective state of β, but only its (subjective) relative state, that codes the information that A has about β. This change is unproblematic, for the same reason for which my information about China changes discontinuously anytime I read an article about China in the newspaper. Relative to A, β is not affected by this change because there is no β-event happening at time t 0 . The meaning of the sudden change in the state of β is that, as a consequence 10 A similar implicit hypothesis, the "retrodiction principle", was pointed out by Bitbol in [18] .
of her measurement on α, A can predict outcomes of future measurement that A herself might do on β, or on B.
Of course the price to pay for this solution of the puzzle is that the sequence of events which is real for B is different from the one which is real for A. For B, there is a quantum event of β at time t ′ 0 and there is no quantum event regarding α at time t ′ 0 .
Relational discussion of the EPR experiment
We shall now present a relational discussion of the EPR experiment, compatible with locality. But first, let us get rid of the problem of separability: in the EPR experiment, the two entangled systems interact with two different observers. Incontestably, both get definite outcomes during these complete measurements (in the sense of Dirac). Hence, the particles are separable. Fine -one might saybut what about the EPR correlations? 4.1. Individual measurements. Say that A measures the spin of α in the direction n at time t 0 . This is an individual observable, denoted S n Aα . Suppose B measures the spin of β in the direction n ′ at time t ′ 0 (individual observable S n ′ Bβ ). Let us denote ǫ Aα and ǫ Bβ (ǫ = ±1) the corresponding outcomes. Because A and B are space-like separated, there cannot exist an observer with respect to which both of these outcomes are actual, and therefore it is meaningless to compare ǫ Aα and ǫ Bβ : A's outcome is fully independent of B's, and vice versa.
EPR correlations. But these individual measures
do not exhaust all possibilities. In the EPR experiment, the composite system α + β is assumed to be in the singlet state. From the relational point of view, this means that some observer, say A, has the information that the total spin of α + β equals to zero. That is, it has interacted with the composite system in the past and has measured the square of the total spin. Let us call this collective observable S But there is another observable whose value QM enables A to predict: S n ′ Aβ , namely the measurement that A can perform on β at the time t 1 , when β is back into causal contact with A. For instance, if permits to predict the future outcome of the individual observable S n Aβ : it is this type of inference which constitutes the "EPR correlations". It concerns a sequence of causally connected interactions.
4.3.
Consistency. Let us bring B back into the picture. It is far from the spirit of RQM to assume that each observer has a "solipsistic" picture of reality, disconnected from the picture of all the other observers. In fact, the very reason we can do science is because of the consistency we find in nature: if I see an elephant and I ask you what you see, I expect you to tell me that you too you see an elephant. If not, something is wrong.
But, as claimed above, any such conversation about elephants is ultimately an interaction between quantum systems. This fact may be irrelevant in everyday life, but disregarding it may give rises to subtle confusions, such as the one leading to the conclusion of nonlocal EPR influences.
In the EPR situation, A and B can be considered two distinct observers, both making measurements on α and β. The comparison of the results of their measurements, we have argued, cannot be instantaneous, that is, it requires A and B to be in causal contact. More importantly, with respect to A, B is to be considered as a normal quantum system (and, of course, with respect to B, A is a normal quantum system). So, what happens if A and B compare notes? Have they seen the same elephant?
It is one of the most remarkable features of quantum mechanics that indeed it automatically guarantees precisely the kind of consistency that we see in nature [5] . Let us illustrate this assuming that both A and B measure the spin in the same direction, say z, that is n = n ′ = z. Since B is a quantum system, there will be an observable S . But this follows from standard QM formalism, because an interaction between β and B that can be interpreted as a measurement is an interaction such that the state (1) and the initial state of α, β and B evolve into the state (relative to A)
with obvious notation. Tracing out the state of α that plays no role here, we get the density matrix
from which (4) follows immediately. Similarly, the state of the ensemble of the four systems α, β, A, B, relative to C evolves, after the two interactions at time t 0 into the state (8)
again with obvious notation. Tracing out the state of α and β, we get the density matrix
which gives (5) immediately. It is clear that everybody sees the same elephant. More precisely: everybody hears everybody else stating that they see the same elephant he sees. This, after all, is the best definition of objectivity.
Comparison with Laudisa's discussion of relational EPR
The EPR argument has been discussed in the context of relational quantum mechanics also by Federico Laudisa, in a recent paper [32] . Laudisa's discussion has some points in common with the one given here, but it differs from the present one in one key respect.
Laudisa starts with reformulation of the EPR hypotheses, namely realism, locality and completeness of QM, in a form meant to be compatible with RQM. The locality principle, in particular, is given the following formulation: No property of a physical system S that is objective relative to some observer can be influenced by measurements performed in space-like separated regions on a different physical system. He is then able to show that the contradiction between locality, formulated in this manner, and QM is itself relative, in the sense that it is frame-dependent: there is always an observer (in the sense of special relativity) for which it is inexistent. 5.1. Laudisa's argument. Here goes Laudisa's argument: after the measurement of the spin of α (say in the direction z) by A, the spin of β (in the same direction z) has a determined valued relative to A. However, according the (relativized) locality principle, β cannot acquire a property relative to A as a consequence of the measure performed on α. Hence, relative to A, the spin of β already had a determined value before the measurement. This fact is in contradiction with the prior state of the compound system relative to A, |ψ
(|↓ α |↑ β − |↑ α |↓ β ), which leads to the improper mixture representing the state of β relative to A: ρ
At that point, Laudisa remarks that, because of space-like separation between A and B, one can find a reference frame in which A's measurement precedes B's. In such a frame, when A faces the locality/completeness contradiction, B has not performed any measurement yet, and therefore escapes the contradiction. What is more, there exists another reference frame in which the chronology of measurements is inverted, so that the contradiction afflicts B but not A. Finally, the EPR contradiction turns out to be frame-dependent, and thus fails to refute the locality principle in an absolute sense.
5.2.
Comparison. Laudisa's interpretation is based on the same premise -relativity of quantum states-, but differs from the one presented here. Unlike Laudisa, we do not understand locality as prohibiting the acquisition of information by an observer on a distant system, but only as prohibiting the possibility that a measurement performed in a region could, in any way, affect the outcomes of a measurement happening in a distant region. In the EPR scenario we have discussed, the state of β relative to B is independent of A's measurement, but not the state of β relative to A. Since the existence of correlations between α and β is know a priori by A, the measurement of an individual observable of α does permit the prediction of the value of an individual observable of β. What is affected by this measurement is not a hypothetical absolute physical state of β, but just A's knowledge about β. It is B's knowledge (or direct experience) about β that cannot be affected by anything performed by A.
Laudisa's residual frame-dependent contradiction between locality and completeness results from an interpretation of locality which disregards the epistemic aspect of relative states. More radical, our conclusion here is that there is no contradiction at all between locality and completeness, nor, more in general, locality and QM predictions.
Conclusion
We have argued that in the context of the relational framework the EPR-type correlations predicted by QM do not violate locality. In fact, the relation between locality and QM is more than the "peaceful coexistence" which is often declared: rather, from the relational perspective, QM is rooted in locality in a way which, although it dismisses Einstein's strict realism (the "real, objective state of affairs"), certainly corroborates QM's claim to be a fundamental theory.
Einstein's original motivation with EPR was not to question locality, but rather to question the completeness of QM, on the basis of a firm confidence in locality. The EPR argument has then turned around, and has been perceived as evidence for non-locality (in fact, a peculiar form of non-locality) in QM, independently from the issue of completeness: after Bell, indeed, it is generally assumed that even a hidden variable theory that completes QM must be non-local. RQM is complete in the sense of exhausting everything that can be said about nature. However, in a sense RQM can be interpreted as the discovery of the incompleteness of the description of reality that any single observer can give: A can measure the pointer variable of B, but the set of the events which is real for B is irreducibly distinct from the set of events which is real for A. In this particular sense, RQM can be said to show the "incompleteness" of single-observer Copenhagen QM. Then Einstein's intuition that the EPR correlations denounce something deeply missing in Copenhagen quantum mechanics can be understood as being correct: The incompleteness of Copenhagen QM is the disregard of the quantum properties of all observers, which leads to paradoxes as the apparent violation of locality exposed by EPR. This is precisely the conclusion that the late Prof. Peres has reached in his analysis of EPR in 2004: "The question raised by EPR 'Can the quantum-mechanical description of physical reality be considered complete?' has a positive answer. However, reality may be different for different observers" [22] .
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